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Highly Persistent Illicit Global Drug Trades
Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2018
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Time to End Restrictive Drug-Control Policies?
Source: LSE Expert Group on the Economics of Drug Policy (2014, 216)
Did we really win the “Drug Wars”?
Perhaps, it is time to re-think and fundamentally restructure Drug-
control polices to be more related to Development Agenda?
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Legalization versus Prohibition
Source: UNODC, World Drug Report 2018
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Knowledge Gap to be lled ...
Large literature
I DD-side largely micro-economic or experimental studies, in
tradition of Becker-Murphy (1988), Becker et al. (2006);
I SS-side on vertical-supply chain [eg: Grossman-Daniel Mejía
(2008), Mejía-Restrepo (2016)].
Shortcomings:
1. Limited number of dynamic GE models that allow study of
growth e¤ects and potential policy trade-o¤s;
2. Separate modelling treatment of consumersoptimizing choice
of drug consumption vs drugstranshipment & production;
3. Non-adoption of a trade framework;
4. Absence of explicitly modeling of illicit rearm trades.
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Our Contributions
Horizontal Perspective - Unied endogenous growth, 2-country
framework with international trade and drugs control
I To preview, we found:
1. While prohibitive drug-control policy (both DD- & SS-side)
appears to be trade- & growth-enhancing to the formal sector,
we uncover a production-consumption growth trade-o¤;
2. However, there is a range of initial rational-addiction
condition where, the more open the consuming country is, the
wider the range of values that would allow drug liberalization
policy to be output growth-enhancing;
3. A more direct supply-side policy aimed at eradicating drug
cultivation remains valid (raising formal trades & growth),
though households in source country are more likely to be
compensated via the resulting (formal) international-trade
expansion e¤ect, the more open it is.
King Yoong Lim & Diego Morris Drugs-for-Guns Trade & Economic Growth
Our Contributions
Horizontal Perspective - Unied endogenous growth, 2-country
framework with international trade and drugs control
I To preview, we found:
1. While prohibitive drug-control policy (both DD- & SS-side)
appears to be trade- & growth-enhancing to the formal sector,
we uncover a production-consumption growth trade-o¤;
2. However, there is a range of initial rational-addiction
condition where, the more open the consuming country is, the
wider the range of values that would allow drug liberalization
policy to be output growth-enhancing;
3. A more direct supply-side policy aimed at eradicating drug
cultivation remains valid (raising formal trades & growth),
though households in source country are more likely to be
compensated via the resulting (formal) international-trade
expansion e¤ect, the more open it is.
King Yoong Lim & Diego Morris Drugs-for-Guns Trade & Economic Growth
Country A - Preferences
maxUt = Et
1X
s=0
s
0B@ (C
A
t+s )
1 & 1CA
1 & 1CA
  L1+ L1+ t+s
+
[t+s (t+s )
 ]
1 & 1

1 & 1
1CA ;
where  uncertain climate factor on support (0; 1], subject to
(1  L)wT ;At AT ;At LT ;At + (1  K )rT ;At Kt = PTt (CAt + It) + Pt t ;
t+1
t
= (1  ) + t
t
;
Kt+1 = (1  K )Kt + It ;
which yields rst-order conditions, highlighted by:
CAt
t
=  &CA(t)
&CA
&
[(1 &)+1](
t
t
)
&CA
& (
Pt
PTt
)&CA :
King Yoong Lim & Diego Morris Drugs-for-Guns Trade & Economic Growth
Country A - Preferences
Another 2 dynamic equations for the 2 types of "good":
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The allocation of tradable consumption in second-stage follows a
straightforward static optimization problem [max
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Country A - Production and Government
I Ordinary tradables: standard perfect competition framework
with continuum of identical rms i 2 (0; 1) hiring labor &
physical capital, though with 1 novel feature of:
Productivity, AT ;At = A
A
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)A :
I Guns production: 1 rm, producing for Government and for
exports; transformnal goods to guns:
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with realizable value of the conscated drugs,
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Country B - Preferences
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Country B - Production
I Ordinary tradables: price-taking rm hiring only labor,
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I The productivity specication means growth in Country Bs
tradable production can only be driven by growth in HT ;Bt , as
it is tied to the scale of its trading partner, as seen in the
rst-order condition:
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Drug production and distribution
I Drug syndicates maximization problem:
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I Drug distribution: smuggling a unit of drug requires t units
of Country B-produced ordinary tradables traded to Country
A (CDistt = tC
A;B
t ), hence driving a wedge:
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Equilibrium Conditions and Solutions
I For Country A,
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I For the market of guns,
Y G ;At = G
G
t + G
F
t :
I Finally, we dene the dynamic international trade equilibrium
and the associated balanced growth equilibrium to solve
analytically for the dynamic system characterizing the model
solutions. The system is parameterized where the BGE
variables are matched to rst moments of the respective
annual series for US and 5 Central American economies in
1990-2015 period.
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Is legalization or prohibition the better approach?
In the benchmark,
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Drug Legalization in Consumer Market
King Yoong Lim & Diego Morris Drugs-for-Guns Trade & Economic Growth
Does prohibitive supply-side policy work?
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More on supply-side intervention
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Is an elevated mark-up in drug price universally good?
drug-control intervention at the transhipment stage does have
signicant e¤ect in the short-to-medium term in reducing drugs
trade, though at the expense of some lost in consumption growth
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Thank You
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Appendix
A dynamic international trade equilibrium for the two-country
model described is a sequence of consumption and labor supply
allocations for household in Country A fCAt ;CA;At ; CA;Bt ; LAt ; tg1t=0
and individuals (in symmetry) in Country B fCBt ;CB ;Bt ;CB ;At ;
LT ;Bt ; L
;B
t g1t=0, physical capital stock in Country A fKAt g1t=0,
accumulated stocks in Country B fH;Bj ;t ;HT ;Bj ;t ; tg1t=0,
productivity fQT ;At ;QT ;Bt g1t=0, output fY T ;At ;Y T ;Bt ;Y G ;At g1t=0,
factor returns fwT ;At ; rT ;At ;w ;Bt ; wT ;Bt g1t=0, prices
fPTt ;Pt ;PGt g1t=0, constant government policy parameters
(L; K ; G ; ) such that, given initial stocks
KA0 ;H
;B
0 ;H
T ;B
0 ;0 > 0, (a) representative household in Country A
maximizes expected utility by choosing consumption allocations for
ordinary tradables, drugs, and labor supply, subject to their
intertemporal budget constraint;
King Yoong Lim & Diego Morris Drugs-for-Guns Trade & Economic Growth
(b) individuals in Country B maximize expected utility by choosing
consumption allocations for ordinary tradables, labor supplies to
both production sectors, investment in formal human capital,
subject to their intertemporal budget constraint; (c) rms in the
ordinary tradable goods sector in Country A maximize prots,
choosing labor and private capital, taking input prices,
productivity, and initial stocks as given; (d) the single
guns-producing rm in Country A maximizes prots by choosing
the amount of ordinary tradables to be used, taking the proprietary
production technology and prices as given; (e) representative rm
in Country B maximizes prots by choosing e¤ective labor input,
taking wages and productivity as given; (f) drug syndicate in
Country B maximizes expected payo¤ by chooseing e¤ective labor
input and guns, taking prices, wage, and aggregate uncertainty as
given; (g) the Government in Country A maintains a balanced
budget; and (h) all markets clear.
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A balanced growth equilibrium is a DITE in which, by implications
of free trade, both Country A and B grow at a constant rate. For a
given set of parameters, this means (i) the endogenous variables all
grow at a constant rate , with the levels exhibit steady-state
properties. This implies that (ii) t = t=t , 
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constant 8t; (iii) factor returns, wages, and prices are constant,
and by implications, (iv) Pt =PTt and PGt =PTt are also constant.
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